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PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE BY DECEDENT:
AN ANOMALY DESTROYED
GEORGE L FALER
In the recent case of Hutton v. Martin,' the plaintiff sued the de-
fendant for wrongful death arising from an automobile collision. The
factual issue was whether plaintiff's decedent was contributorily negli-
gent by driving on the wrong side of the road at the time of the accident.
There were no eye-witnesses to the accident except the defendant
Martin. The trial judge gave the jury the following instruction: "You
are instructed that when a person is injured and dies as a result of a
collision, a presumption arises that the person killed was at the time
exercising due care and that he did all that the situation then and there
presented to him required him to do to save himself from injury, when
there is no credible evidence to the contrary" On appeal, it was held
that giving this instruction is reversible error.
This decision overturned a great deal of case doctrine in Washington.
The presumption that a decedent exercised due care and is free from
contributory negligence has probably been a part of Washington law
since 1905.2 The most extreme pronouncement was in Karp v. Herder,'
where, although two disinterested witnesses testified as to conduct of
the decedent showing contributory negligence, it was held that the
trial court properly instructed the jury about the presumption of due
care. Retreat from this extreme position began with Morris v. Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co.' The court overruled the
holding of the Karp case and held that the presumption entirely disap-
pears upon the introduction of the testimony of disinterested witnesses
as to the action of a decedent, and where such testimony is introduced,
the presumption should in no event be submitted to the jury Under
the dicta of the Morris case, however, where the only testimony intro-
duced in opposition to the presumption is that of interested witnesses,
or where there is no testimony as to the action of the deceased immedi-
141 Wn2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 (1953).Woolfv. Washington Ry. & Navigation Co., 37 Wash. 491, 79 Pac. 997 (1905).
See also Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 11 Wn.2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1945).
8 181 Wash. 583, 44 P.2d 808 (1935).
4 1 Wn.2d 587, 97 P.2d 119 (1939). See Falknor, Notes on Presumptions, 15 WASH.
L. Rzv. 71 (1940).
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ately prior to and at the time of the accident, the presumption is still to
go to the jury.
The Karp and Morris cases differed regarding the type of testimony,
whether interested or disinterested, that was sufficient to rebut the
presumption. In the instant case there was no testimony whatsoever to
rebut the presumption, except that given by the defendant. Thus the
court by finding it reversible error to instruct the jury that the plaintiff
was presumed to be in the exercise of due care destroyed the pre-
sumption entirely. The Morris case is expressly overruled.
The reason for abandoning the presumption of due care on the part
of the deceased is that it serves no function. The conventional use
for a presumption is simply to aid the party having the burden of
proof. It serves in the absence of evidence and allows the party who
has the benefit of it to avoid a non-suit without introducing evidence.'
Washington has always followed the rule that the burden of proof of
contributory negligence is upon the defendant." This being so, the
application of the presumption by the court prior to the instant case
violated the conventional use of presumptions, for the presumption
operated against the defendant who already had the burden of proof
on the issue of contributory negligence. All that need be done is to
instruct the jury that the defendant has the burden of proof.'
The instant case, which destroyed the anomalous presumption of
due care on the part of a decedent, is consistent with other Washington
cases developing the theory of presumption.'
Although the Hutton case, by withdrawing the presumption from
the jury, seemed to destroy the presumption, some hint of its qualified
revival appears in a subsequent case. In Smith v. Yamashita,9 plain-
tiff sued defendant for wrongful death of a pedestrian. Plaintiff's dece-
dent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in that he violated
a city ordinance by crossing a street between intersections. On appeal,
although the court expressly sanctioned the holding of the Hutton case,
it held that the lower court properly refused to give the defendant a
non-suit because "Apellant [the plaintiff ] had the benefit of the pre-
8 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940).
"Northern Pac. R. Co. v. O'Brien, I Wash. 599, 21 Pac. 32 (1889).
7 Falknor, Notes on Presumptions, 15 WASH. L. Ray. 71, 85 (1940).
8 Scarpelli v. Washington Water Power Co., 63 Wash. 18, 114 Pac. 870 (1911);
Steiner v. Royal Blue Cab Co., 172 Wash. 396, 20 P.2d 39 (1933) ; McGinn v. Kimmel,
36 Wn.2d 786, 221 P.2d 467 (1950) ; Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wn.2d 802, 180 P.2d
564 (1947).
9 42 Wn.2d 490, 256 P.2d 281 (1953).
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sumption of due care on the part of the decedent. ... "I' Apparently
then the presumption of due care on the part of a deceased still exists,
and it can be used by the court in denying defendant a non-suit because
of contributory negligence. The narrow holding of the Hutton case
is that it is reversible error to instruct the jury on the presumption, but
it is clear that there is no substantial ground for distinguishing between
the use of the presumption by the court or by the jury. Indeed, in the
Hutton case, it appears that neither the court nor the jury should use
the presumption. "'The suggestion is that contributory negligence in
a wrongful death action may and should be disposed of by both the
court and the jury in terms of burden of proof alone .... ) ,1 The
presumption is anomolous whether employed by the court or the jury
in Washington."
10 Id. at 492, 256 P2d at 282 (1953).
1141 Wn.2d 780, 789, 252 P.2d 581, 587 (1953), quoting from Falknor, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 82.
12 A presumption of due care on the part of a deceased fortfeasor is recognized by
L. 1953, c. 73; RCW 4.20.045. The statute prevents abatement of an action because
of the death of the tortfeasor. Under the Hutton v. Martin rule, instruction to thejury on the presumption will probably be error. See Richards, Torts, 28 WASH. L.
Ray. 201, 203 (1953), where the probable effect of the statute is discussed.
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